In 1828, William MacKinnon published a 350-page treatise on a term of increasing importance in parliamentary debates: public opinion. By charting, as he says, the 'rise, progress and present state of public opinion in Great Britain and other parts of the World', MacKinnon attempts a sociological study of the conditions necessary for, and the consequences following on, a flourishing public sphere. MacKinnon emphasizes that public opinion as a discrete social formation had only recently come into existence; changes in education, physical infrastructure and technologies of printing had for the first time made it possible for information to circulate under its own steam, as it were, independent of personal and local associations: 'to be styled public opinion', a sentiment must be based on 'general information'. 'In the present day an opinion, by being printed and disseminated', he observes, 'can with ease be "wafted from Indus to the Pole," and pour out the best feelings and best sentiments of the human mind, in a thousand different channels.' 1 Public opinion acquires its own agency in the social system; because it does not inhere in or adhere to individuals or parties, it works as an independent factor, indeed the major factor, in securing a liberal form of government. Apparently authorless, circulating swiftly and silently, opinion operates, in the Foucaultian sense, as a true technology.
MacKinnon's optimism about the liberating effects of public opinion contrasts starkly with John Stuart Mill's more familiar account of its consequences in On Liberty, published thirty years later. Mill's pessimism hinges on precisely the kind of technological efficiency MacKinnon celebrates. 'Improvement in the means of communication' and of education promote widespread 'access to the general stock of facts and sentiments'; information so swiftly and widely circulated takes on a social agency and authority of its own. 'There needs to be protection', Mill urges, 'against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct/ 2 Removed from its personal and local associations, opinion becomes a lifeless machine, not a vital force for personal and social development. Where MacKinnon sees a technology of enlightenment -the 'powers of machinery', he repeatedly interjects, produce a modern liberal society -Mill sees, in a foreshadowing of Adorno and Horkheimer's argument about the culture industry, a technology of mass production.
3 Where for MacKinnon public opinion is the engine for a liberal society, for Mill it brings social progress to a halt; public opinion stifles the 'vital' intellectual 'power' that would mark a truly liberalized public sphere.
My purpose in contrasting these particular views at the start of this essay is to set up what may seem at first a simplistic question: what has happened between MacKinnon's optimism and Mill's pessimism? There are all sorts of problems embedded in such a formulation. It assumes the existence of a single strand of liberalism that can be portrayed as having turned back on itself, and neatly fits MacKinnon and Mill into that strand. 4 And it assumes a kind of progressive historical logic to the thirty-year time span, a motivating cause out of which Mill's views can be extrapolated as an effect. There are two reasons that I have chosen nevertheless to pose the question in that way. The first is that, as I will explain shortly, one influential narrative which serves as the jumping-off point for most studies of the public sphere is built precisely on those assumptions. The second reason that I want to propose so direct a conjuncture is that the space of years can be used to suggest a different kind of historical narrative, less concerned with development than with specificity of terms. Both writers identify public opinion as a technology of information: not as a particular set of opinions associated with one party or institution, nor as an actual representation of the body politic (the kind of rhetoric, as Michael Warner has demonstrated, current in American writing of the period), but as an autonomous cultural force.
5 For both writers, public opinion is coterminous with the circulation of printed information; what they are analysing is what we have come to call print culture.
Perhaps this seems too obvious to need pointing out. It is now almost a commonplace to recognize that one venue in which notions of the political are negotiated is the scene of writing. But we have, I think, greatly simplified the story of how print and political culture in the nineteenth century are connected. What I will suggest is just one means of complicating that narrative. In brief, I want to question the ways in which our histories of print culture have been dominated by one model of reading, that is, one model of thinking about the process of reading. These histories emphasize reading as rationality, the internalization of narratives, a mode of learning to categorize and make hierarchies of knowledge. But in the early nineteenth century one can trace the influence of a model of reading that is almost diametrically opposed to this description. It is that quite different modeland the process of circulating knowledge that follows from it -which is behind the discussions of public opinion I have cited. What the passages from MacKinnon and Mill signal is less the structural transformation of the
